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PART DATA

# FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- NON-CIL HARDWARE NUMBER:05-6QA-BRPC5 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: EPD&C - MEDS

REVISION: 0

01/19/95

PART NAME PART NUMBER VENDOR NAME VENDOR NUMBER LRU : FWD PCA 1 VQ70-763320 VO70-763340 LRU : FWD PCA 2 LRU FWD PCA 3 VO70-763360 MC450-0017-X100 SRU : CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

#### EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:

REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC), 10 AMPS

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: 81V76A22RPC36

> 82V76A23RPC50 83V76A24RPC45 83V76A24RPC46

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 4

FOUR

FUNCTION:

PROVIDES REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER APPLICATION. TO THE INTEGRATED DISPLAY PROCESSOR (IDP) POWER SUPPLY THE MAIN BUS VOLTAGE (28VDC) IS APPLIED TO THE JDP WHEN THE RPC IS ENERGIZED BY THE "CRT" POWER SWITCH.

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS: VS70-730182D

\$\$D90D0009B, CP#1

MC409-0185D, AMENDMENT E01

\$SD92D0643D, CP#2

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FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS FMEA -- NON-CIL FAILURE MODE

NUMBER: 05-6QA-BRPC5-01

REVISION#: 1

04/26/98

SUBSYSTEM NAME: EPD&C - MEDS

LRU: FWD PCA 1, 2, 3 ITEM NAME: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

**CRITICALITY OF THIS** FAILURE MODE: 1R3

FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY/

REQUIRED FAULT TOLERANCE/ACHIEVED FAULT TOLERANCE:1R/2/2

FAILURE MODE:

LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO CONDUCT, FAILS TO TURN "ON".

MISSION PHASE:

PL PRE-LAUNCH LO LIFT-OFF

OO ON-ORBIT DO DE-ORBIT

LS LANDING/SAFING

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:

102 COLUMBIA

103 DISCOVERY 104 ATLANTIS

105 ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:

PIECE PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PROCESSING ANOMALY, THERMAL STRESS

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

CRITICALITY 1R2 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY (AVIONICS ONLY)? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN

A) PASS

B) PASS

C) PASS

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)

B)

C)

METHOD OF FAULT DETECTION:

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# FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- NON-CIL FAILURE MODE NUMBER: 05-6QA-BRPCS-01

VISUAL; ASSOCIATED MDU'S WILL DISPLAY ERROR MESSAGE AFTER COMMUNICATION BETWEEN IDP & MDU ARE LOST. ASSOCIATED GPC WILL ANNUNCIATE ERROR MESSAGE IF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN IDP AND GPC IS LOST.

MASTER MEAS, LIST NUMBERS: NONE

CORRECTING ACTION: AUTOMATED

### CORRECTING ACTION DESCRIPTION:

IF MANUAL CONFIGURATION IS SELECTED, THE MDU DISPLAYS AN ERROR MESSAGE INDICATING PORT FAILURE AFTER THREE POLL-LISTENING ATTEMPTS AND CONTINUE TO LISTEN FOR THE VALID COMMANDS OVER THE SAME PORT UNTIL COMMANDED BY THE CREW TO SWITCH PORT. IF AUTOMATIC CONFIGURATION IS SELECTED, THE MDU SWITCHES TO OTHER PORT IN AN ATTEMPT TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE ALTERNATE IDP AFTER THREE UNSUCCESSFUL POLL-LISTENING ATTEMPTS. IF COMMUNICATION WITH ALTERNATE IDP IS SUCCESSFUL, THAT IDP WILL PROVIDE AN INDICATION TO CREW ON THIS MDU OF THE FAILURE ENCOUNTERED ON THE ORIGINAL PORT. IF COMMUNICATION WITH ALTERNATE PORT IS NOT SUCCESSFUL, THE MDU WILL DISPLAY AN I/O ERROR MESSAGE AND TOGGLE FROM PORT TO PORT UNTIL SUCCESSFUL COMMUNICATION IS ACHIEVED, OR CREW ACTION.

# REMARKS/RECOMMENDATIONS:

NONE

#### - FAILURE EFFECTS -

# (A) SUBSYSTEM:

LOSS OF POWER TO THE IDP

# (B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):

NO EFFECT FIRST FAILURE

### (C) MISSION:

NO EFFECT FIRST FAILURE

# (D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):

NO EFFECT FIRST FAILURE

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# FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- NON-CIL FAILURE MODE NUMBER: 05-6QA-BRPC5-01

## (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:

CR!TICALITY 1R3:

POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWIVEHICLE AFTER THREE FAILURES (LOSS OF RPC OUTPUT, LOSS OF SECOND IDP, AND LOSS OF THIRD IDP) DUE TO INABILITY TO MONITOR/RESPOND TO SYSTEM FAILURES AND LAND THE VEHICLE SAFELY.

NOTE: HEAD UP DISPLAY IS NOT A USABLE SOURCE OF INFORMATION PRIOR TO MAJOR MODE 305.

## - TIME FRAME -

TIME FROM FAILURE TO CRITICAL EFFECT: MINUTES

TIME FROM FAILURE OCCURRENCE TO DETECTION: SECONDS

TIME FROM DETECTION TO COMPLETED CORRECTING ACTION: SECONDS

IS TIME REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT CORRECTING ACTION LESS THAN TIME TO EFFECT? YES

RATIONALE FOR TIME TO CORRECTING ACTION VS TIME TO EFFECT:
N/A (CORRECTIVE ACTION CAN BE COMPLETED BEFORE CRITICAL EFFECT)

HAZARD REPORT NUMBER(\$):

HAZARD(S) DESCRIPTION:

- APPROVALS -

nmith Site pana 4/28/98

SS&PAE ENGR

: N. D. NGUYEN

MEDS SYSTEM

: M. B. WARNER

MEDS HARDWARE

: R. M. SITAPARA